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Abstract: In China extensive, co-ordinated strikes such as those that have taken place in 
Cambodia in recent years remain rare, with most protests initiated by Chinese workers 
contained inside single factories or industrial zones. Also, while Cambodian workers often 
mobilise for their interests and broader policy issues, such as the determination of the 
minimum wage, Chinese workers largely limit themselves to protests against violations of 
their legal rights. How can these different patterns of labour activism be explained? Through 
factory gate surveys and interviews conducted during the summer of 2016 in a sample of 
Hong Kong-owned garment factories in Dongguan and Phnom Penh, this study provides a 
comparative analysis of the root causes of labour activism in China and Cambodia. In 
particular, the article focuses on three elements that play an important role in determining 
labour activism: the expectations of the workers regarding wages; the workers’ perception of 
the labour law and the legal system; and trade union pluralism. 
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On December 24, 2013 tens of thousands of garment workers went on strike in Cambodia, 
demanding that the government double the minimum wage from US$80 to $160, much more 
than the $95 that the authorities were willing to concede (The Phnom Penh Post, December 
26, 2013; WRC 2014, 9-13).1 The mobilisation was launched by rank-and-file workers 
without instructions by union federations and lasted almost two weeks, paralysing the entire 
Cambodian industrial system, while trade unions, politicians, and business associations fired 
wild accusations at each other (AMRC 2014, 8). The deadlock was broken on the morning of 
January 3, 2014, when military police opened fire on the striking workers on Veng Sreng 
Boulevard, in the suburbs of Phnom Penh, killing five and injuring around 40 (The Phnom 
Penh Post, January 3, 2014; AMRC 2014, 21). This was not the first instance of massive, co-
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ordinated strikes in the Cambodian garment industry, and would not be the last. A few months 
later, in April 2014, 20,000 workers in a special economic zone in Bavet, Svay Rieng 
province, went on strike to claim a bonus that their colleagues in a neighbouring factory had 
received for not going on strike during the wave of protests of January 2014 (The Phnom 
Penh Post, April 28, 2014). Again, in December 2015, some 30,000 workers from 39 
factories in three special economic zones in Bavet brought production to a standstill 
demanding that minimum wage increase to $148 a month rather than the scheduled $140 (The 
Phnom Penh Post, December 23, 2015). 
As Arnold (2014 and 2017) has pointed out, Cambodian garment workers have 
repeatedly staged co-ordinated spontaneous protests on matters regarding their interests, in 
particular demands to increase the minimum wage. This represents a stark contrast with the 
pattern of activism in labour-intensive industries in China, where most labour protests remain 
unco-ordinated and limited to single workplaces and industrial zones, with the workers setting 
forth rights-based demands (Chan and Siu 2012; Lee 2007; 2016).2 Of course, the political 
system of the two countries is very different. While China is a Leninist one-party system 
dominated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Cambodia has been labelled an “electoral 
authoritarian regime with pseudodemocratic elements” (McCargo 2005, 106), or a case of 
“competitive authoritarianism,” defined as a “civilian regime in which formal democratic 
institutions exist and widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which 
incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their 
opponents” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 5). Still, Chinese and Cambodian authorities both 
preside over very repressive environments and have repeatedly used force to suppress labour 
unrest. If workers in both countries face dire consequences for mobilising, why are the 
patterns of labour activism so different? To respond to this question, this article will focus on 
three elements that play a fundamental role in shaping the workers’ proclivity to organise: 
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workers’ needs and expectations towards wages; the different level of saturation of official 
discourses of labour rights promoted by the authorities; and the existence – or lack of – union 
pluralism. While there are other factors at play in determining the different patterns and 
significant local variations (especially in China), these three aspects represent an important 
starting point for a better understanding of the different patterns of labour organising in the 
two countries. 
For the sake of clarity – and to avoid undue generalisations – this analysis will focus 
exclusively on the garment sector. This choice was basically unavoidable, as this industry – 
along with tourism and construction – is the main pillar of the Cambodian economy, 
employing more than 600,000 workers and accounting for as much as 80% of the country’s 
total merchandise exports (ILO 2017). While labour exploitation is common in many other 
sectors – and while Chinese and Cambodian workers in other industries have not refrained 
from engaging in protests – the garment sector remains an important focus of labour 
discontent in both countries. In China, one has only to think about the massive protests that 
erupted in 2014 at Yue Yuen, a huge footwear company based in Dongguan, Guangdong 
province, when tens of thousands of workers went on strike to demand the payment of their 
social security contributions (Schmalz, Sommer, and Xu 2017). In Cambodia, this restlessness 
can be seen not only in the number of strikes that made the headlines in the national press 
over the past few years, but also, indirectly, in the attention that Prime Minister Hun Sen has 
dedicated to garment workers in electoral campaigning for the 2018 national elections.  In 
August 2017, he started holding weekly meetings with garment industry employees in various 
industrial zones around the Cambodian capital. He also promised that workers would get free 
health care, free access to public transport in Phnom Penh and a significant minimum wage 
increase if his party won (The Phnom Penh Post, August 21, 2017). 
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While there is also a growing body of literature that put Chinese labour in a 
comparative perspective (see Chan 2016), this article represents the first comparative study of 
Chinese and Cambodian garment workers. Although the two countries are occasionally 
juxtaposed in discussions of global investment trends – sometimes to say that garment 
industries are leaving China to move to countries like Cambodia, where labour is cheaper, and 
sometimes to say the opposite, that labour unrest in Cambodia is scaring away investors in 
favour of other more stable countries, including China – no comparative study of Chinese and 
Cambodian labour issues has been completed. Most literature on Cambodian labour focuses 
on the nexus between export-oriented garment manufacturing and labour rights (see, for 
example, Chiu 2007; Kolben 2004; Polaski 2006). Only occasional forays have been made 
into the realm of garment workers’ voice and agency (Arnold 2014 and 2017; Derks 2008; 
Ward and Mouyly 2016). This article is the first effort to “quantify” subjective matters such 
as the expectations of Cambodian garment workers in matters of wage and work hours, as 
well as their knowledge and perception of the labour law. Chinese labour, on the contrary, is 
the object of a wide-ranging literature that covers the topic from almost every angle. Not only 
is there no lack of studies dedicated to the agency of Chinese garment workers (Chan and Siu 
2010 and 2011; Fan 2016; Siu 2017), but China scholars have also investigated issues related 
to the subjectivity of Chinese workers. Several studies investigate how Chinese workers 
perceive the labour law and the legal system (Gallagher 2006 and 2007; Gallagher and Wang 
2013; Gallagher and Yang 2017; Wong 2011); attempt to assess the workers’ expectations in 
terms of wages and labour conditions (Chan and Siu 2010 and 2011; Franceschini, Siu, and 
Chan 2012); or look into how the party-state attempts to promote the labour law as a 
“hegemonic discourse” aimed at controlling and channelling workers’ demands (Blecher 
2002; Cheng 2017; Hui 2016a, 2016b, and 2017). It is this literature that this article engages. 
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The research for this article combines quantitative and qualitative methods. During the 
summer of 2016, two surveys were conducted, aimed at assessing the expectations of 
Cambodian and Chinese garment workers in terms of salaries and labour conditions, as well 
as their perception of the law and the trade unions. The first survey was conducted in June 
and July 2016 at three garment factories owned by Hong Kong companies in Dongguan, 
Guangdong province in China’s south. These factories employed 2,000, 1,000, and 800 
workers, and in each one of them respectively 120, 90, and 40 questionnaires were collected, 
for a total of 250 questionnaires. The second survey was carried out from July to September 
2016 in three Hong Kong-owned garment factories in Phnom Penh, where the garment 
industry is concentrated. In this case, the factories employed 5,700, 2,100, and 1,100 workers, 
and in each one of them respectively 130, 121, and 40 questionnaires were collected, for a 
total of 291 questionnaires. To avoid interference from the management and possible biases in 
the responses of the workers, no permission was sought from the factory and precautions were 
taken to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees. All respondents were approached outside 
the factory, most often in their accommodation after their shift had ended or in restaurants 
around the factory during their lunch break. In Cambodia, these quantitative data were then 
integrated with 20 semi-structured interviews with garment workers employed in the sampled 
factories, as well as additional interviews with local lawyers specialised in labour disputes, 
leaders of independent unions and labour NGO activists. In China 20 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with garment workers in the sampled factories, complemented by 
dozens of interviews with labour activists based in Guangdong province collected since 2009. 
The choice of focussing on Hong Kong-owned factories was motivated by the 
economic relevance in both countries of the investments coming from the former British 
colony. In 2016, entrepreneurs from Hong Kong not only represented the second largest 
group of new investors in the Cambodian garment sector, right after their mainland Chinese 
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counterparts (ILO 2017), but they were also the largest source of overseas direct investment 
in mainland China (Hong Kong Trade Development Council 2017). The factories in the 
sample were chosen on the basis of three criteria: (i) their location – they had to be located in 
the same administrative area, especially in China, where minimum wages varies from city to 
city; (ii) their size – the factories in the two countries had to be roughly comparable in terms 
of number of employees; and (iii) access to the workforce – since the survey was conducted 
without any prior knowledge of the management, it was important to choose factories with 
accessible worker accommodations close by. Also, it is important to underline that the 
research focussed on factories that were formally licensed, not on unregistered sub-
contracting workshops where labour conditions are notoriously worse. In this sense, while the 
sample offers a good overview of the situation in the garment industry in the two countries, it 
does not take into account those semi-legal or illegal realities where abuses of labour rights 
are even more common. 
This article is in five sections. First, it describes the sample, highlighting differences 
and commonalities between the Chinese and Cambodian workforce. Second, it considers the 
wages in the garment industry in the two countries, comparing the salaries workers are 
entitled to, those that they actually get, and those that they desire. Third, it outlines the 
different rationales that led the Chinese and Cambodian authorities to adopt a labour 
legislation and analyses how workers relate to these laws and to the legal system. In a fourth 
section, the article considers how workers perceive the unions and how they feel about strikes. 
In a final section, some general conclusions are drawn. 
 
SETTING THE SCENE 
Due to its low capital requirements, limited automation and minimal demands in terms 
of skills, the garment industry is an ideal start-up industry for any economy with a large 
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unskilled workforce and bare financial and logistical infrastructure. Still, these very elements 
make the industry highly susceptible to fluctuations in the cost of labour, rendering it 
unsuitable for more developed economies. This unsuitability is particularly apparent in the 
case of China. After four decades of “reforms and opening up,” China remains the undisputed 
global leader in the garment sector, with its 2016 exports worth as much as $253 billion 
(WITS 2018a). There are, however, already signs that its garment industry is unravelling due 
to rising labour costs as the country embarks on an ambitious path of industrial upgrading 
(Van Der Kamp 2016). In contrast, the Cambodian garment sector was established only 
recently – the first garment factories appeared only in 1994, when Cambodia finally began to 
emerge from more than two decades of chaos and guerrilla warfare – and maintains a positive 
outlook (Arnold and Shih 2010). Having started from barely $80 million in exports in 1996, 
in 2015 the Cambodian garment sector had become a $6.8 billion industry, the ninth largest in 
the world after China, the European Union, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Hong Kong, India, Turkey 
and Indonesia (ILO 2017). More importantly, while the garment industry today occupies a 
relatively minor part of the Chinese economy – in 2016 only 12% of the Chinese merchandise 
exports were in the textile garment sector (WITS 2018b) – Cambodia’s economic growth 
remains heavily dependent on garments, with about 610,000 workers employed in the sector 
in 2016 and as much as 80% of the country’s total merchandise exports over the same year 
being garment and footwear products (ILO 2017). 
In spite of their different size and significance for the domestic economy, the Chinese 
and Cambodian garment industries have one important factor in common: a large pool of 
unskilled rural labourers willing to move to the cities and toil in factories. There are, however, 
some fundamental demographic differences between the two workforces. While the garment 
sector in both countries employs mostly younger women from the countryside, generally 
viewed by employers as docile and apt at sewing, since the early 2000s coastal areas in China 
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– including Dongguan – have been hit by cyclical “labour shortages” that have forced 
employers to be less picky (Zhang and Liu 2012). With many young Chinese rural women 
deciding to stay home to raise a family or to look for a job in townships closer to their 
hometowns, factories find it increasingly difficult to recruit young female workers, so they 
have to hire older women or even men (Siu 2017). In Cambodia, on the contrary, 87% of 
garment workers are female (ILO 2017). The survey sample for this study reflects this trend, 
with only 74% of the Chinese sample composed of women, compared to 91.7% in Cambodia. 
That a shift in the employment pattern is taking place in China is also suggested by the fact 
that the workers in the Chinese sample were older, with half of them born before 1980 – 
compared to 8.6% of their Cambodian counterparts – and only 6.4% born in the 1990s – 
compared to 41.9% in Cambodia. This age gap translates in a higher percentage of married 
workers in China – 95.2% compared to 57.7% in Cambodia – and in a higher percentage of 
Chinese workers with children – 98.8% compared to 52.2% in Cambodia. It also means that 
Chinese workers have a longer migration history: while 45.8% of the Chinese workers had 
left their rural hometowns at some point in the 1990s and 46.6% in the 2000s (the others had 
migrated in the 2010s), 58.8% of the Cambodian workers had left the countryside after 2010.  
Almost all workers in both samples came from the countryside, but there is a 
fundamental difference between the two workforces. While most workers in the Chinese 
sample are second-generation migrants, in Cambodia the vast majority comes from families 
without any previous experience of migration. More specifically, 53.1% of the sampled 
Chinese workers had at least one migrant parent – with 41.1% of the whole Chinese sample 
declaring that both parents had been migrants – compared to only 4.5% in Cambodia. This is 
easily explained, if we consider that China begun its economic reforms in the late 1970s and 
Cambodia’s industrial base re-emerged from the ruins of civil war only in the mid-1990s. 
That Cambodia is lagging behind China in terms of social development emerges also from the 
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data on education. While 77.8% of the sampled Chinese workers had attended middle school 
or above, only 44.3% of the Cambodian workers had attained the same level of education, the 
others having only an elementary education or not even that. Significantly, 4.8% of the 
Cambodian workers were illiterate, none of the Chinese was.  
Another factor worth considering is employment status. The workforce in both 
countries appears to enjoy formal employment. First, almost all of them – 99.2% in China and 
86% in Cambodia – had been hired directly by the company, with only a tiny minority of 
interns and, in a few cases, dispatch-workers. Second, all workers in the Chinese sample had 
signed a written labour contract, compared to 67.7% of the workers in Cambodia, where an 
additional 30.9% claimed to have an oral contract, a possibility allowed by the national 
legislation. Still, this does not mean that these workers were not living in a precarious 
situation. Although medium to long-term employment is a common occurrence in the garment 
industry in both countries – 36.8% of the workers in the Chinese sample and 46.7% in the 
Cambodian sample had worked in the same factory for more than three years – fixed-term 
contract were the norm, with 88.3% of the workforce in China and 65% in Cambodia hired on 
these terms. The important difference was that in China the average length of a fixed-term 
contract was around three years, in Cambodia it was only six months. This finding reflects 
how the Cambodian garment industry has shifted from a reliance on open-end contracts in the 
mid-1990s, when the Cambodian authorities attempted to gain a competitive advantage over 
lower-cost competitors by projecting a worker-friendly image to western buyers, to a 
widespread use of short-term contracts, a situation made possible by some ambiguities in the 
interpretation of the Labour Law (Yale Law School 2011). Nevertheless, although the 
majority of Cambodian workers were subjected to this form of extreme precariousness, 33.6% 
of them had a permanent contract with the company, a finding that suggests the existence in 
Cambodian garment factories of a “labour force dualism” (Zhang 2015) accompanied by 
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slight differences in the economic treatment, as the permanent workers in my survey on 
average received a take-home wage of $260.71 a month, compared to the $234.94 of their 
non-permanent counterparts.  
In sum, compared to their Cambodian counterparts, the Chinese workers in the sample 
were older, better educated, and had a history of migration that often extended to the 
generation of their parents. A larger percentage of them had children to worry about and their 
employment was relatively more stable, with a prevalence of fixed-term contracts of three 
years. On the contrary, Cambodian workers were younger and less educated, the vast majority 
of them coming from families that had not had any previous experience of industrial work. 
While they were subjected to extreme precariousness, with labour contracts up for renewal 
every six months, overall they spent a longer time working in the same factory – which means 
that these contracts were very likely to be extended – and in several cases had even been 
granted a permanent position, something that rarely happens in China. In other words, 
although for different reasons, workers in both countries had much at stake when considering 
whether to pick up a quarrel with their employers.  
 
WAGES: REALITY, EXPECTATIONS, AND NEEDS 
 
Working in a garment factory can be an exhausting experience. The Chinese workers 
in the sample worked an average of 10.3 hours a day from Monday to Friday, plus an average 
of 9.9 hours on Saturdays with only Sundays off. This is a violation of the national labour 
law, which states that workers should work no more than eight hours a day and 44 hours a 
week on the average, with a maximum of 36 hours of overtime a month. In Cambodia, the 
workers on average laboured 9.7 hours a day from Monday to Saturday and got only one day 
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off every two weeks, another violation of the national legislation, which allows 48 hours a 
week, with no more than two hours of overtime a day. That the workload was perceived as 
excessive was made abundantly clear by the fact that, when asked how many hours they 
would have like to work in order not to impair their health, workers in both countries 
indicated around 9 hours (9.1 hours in China and 9 hours in Cambodia), with four days of rest 
a month (3.9 in China and 3.4 in Cambodia). Still, overtime was not considered a problem per 
se, as it was perceived as the only viable way to increase an otherwise meagre salary. When 
asked whether they would still have been willing to work overtime in a situation in which 
their salary was enough to cover their life expenses, 51.4% of the Chinese workers said yes, 
compared to 90.7% of the Cambodian workers, a disparity which might be related to 
differences in the payment system, with the majority of the workers in China (90.8%) paid by 
piece-rate – a much more exhausting arrangement than time rate – and 72.8% of the 
Cambodian workers by time rate (on the difference between time rate and piece rate, see 
Franceschini, Siu, and Chan 2016).  
While protests related to long work hours remain rare in China and Cambodia, wages 
remain a major reason of worker discontent in both countries. Figures 1 and 2 allow us to 
compare the workers’ take-home wage with the wage they desire and the wage they need. The 
first column in the figures shows the minimum wage at the time of the survey. In China, local 
governments can decide their own monthly minimum wage and in Dongguan during the 
summer of 2016 it was set at 1,510 yuan (roughly $226.85). Until recently, in Cambodia only 
the garment and footwear sector was covered by a minimum wage, which at the time of the 
survey the government had set at $140 per month, the same figure for all the country.3 The 
Cambodian minimum wage is decided by the government on the basis of the recommendation 
coming from a tripartite Labour Advisory Committee composed of 28 representatives, 14 
from the government, seven from the employers’ associations, and seven from the unions 
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(five of whom are staunch supporters of the ruling party). Significantly, while in China there 
are no reported strikes related to minimum wage, in Cambodia minimum wage remains a 
controversial issue. As mentioned above, in early January 2014 massive strikes and 
demonstrations of garment workers protesting over the government’s refusal to raise the 
minimum wage ended after the intervention of the military police. Although in the following 
years there were no more demonstrations during the minimum wage negotiations, the raises 
that were granted by the government always fell far short of the expectations of independent 
trade unions and workers. In 2016, for instance, independent unions pushed for a new 
minimum wage of no less than $171 (up from $140), but the government settled on a figure of 
$153, far closer to the $147 proposed by the employers’ association (The Phnom Penh Post, 
September 30, 2016). This was far below the $177 that some local and global trade unions 
and advocacy groups had been demanding as a “living wage” for Cambodian garment 
workers since 2014 (Clean Clothes Campaign 2015).  
 
Figure 
1. Wage and Perceived Needs in China, 2016 
Wage and Perceived Needs per Month in China (in US$)
Minimum Wage
Perceived Needs
Desired Take-home Wage
Take-home Wage
Basic Wage
Desired Basic Wage
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
8
0
0
226.85
(RMB 1510)
320.15
(RMB 2131)
490.14
(RMB 3262.56) 450.97
(RMB 3001.80)
657.24
(RMB 4374.80)
294.28
(RMB 1958.80)
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Note: US$ rates with corresponding amount in RMB, calculated on the basis of the exchange 
rate on July 3, 2016 according to www.oanda.com. 
Source: Author’s surveys. 
 
Figure 2. Wage and Perceived Needs in Cambodia, 2016 (US$) 
Source: Author’s surveys. 
 
The second column in the figures shows the basic monthly wage that the factories 
guarantee to workers regardless of the effective workload. What is remarkable here is that 
while the Cambodian factories offered a basic monthly wage that coincided with the 
minimum wage, in China the basic monthly wage was significantly higher (41.1% more) than 
the legal minimum. This is significant as it means that increases in the minimum wage in 
Cambodia have a direct impact on the income of the workers, contrarily to what happens in 
China, where the workers receive higher basic salaries and therefore do not have a high stake 
in the government’s decision on the matter. Thus, it is not surprising that Cambodian workers 
are willing go on strike over the minimum wage, while in China the issue is shrouded in 
Wage and Perceived Needs per Month in Cambodia (in US$)
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Desired Take-home Wage
Take-home Wage
Basic Wage
Desired Basic Wage
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silence. For instance, when a labour lawyer in Shenzhen was asked what he thought about the 
recent decision of the Guangdong provincial authorities to freeze the minimum wage for two 
years in order to support companies during an economic downturn, he replied: 
 
Honestly, it will not have the least impact [on the workers]. This thing is terribly 
empty, because workers generally already receive actual wages that far exceed the 
minimum. Strictly speaking, if you use the minimum wage to hire people on the 
market, you won’t be able to find anybody (Interview, Shenzhen, August 9, 2016). 
 
The third column of the figures shows the desired basic wage and is the response to 
the question “in a situation in which you have to work only 40 hours a week [48 hours in 
Cambodia] and do not have to work overtime, how much do you think a reasonable salary 
would be?” Comparing the desired basic wage with the actual basic wage highlights that 
workers in both countries thought it reasonable to receive significantly higher basic wages, 
with the Chinese workers wanting 53.1% more and the Cambodian workers 44.1% more. The 
desired basic wage should also be compared with the fourth column, which shows the take-
home wage; that is, how much the workers actually were paid after taxes and other 
deductions. While for Cambodian workers the take-home wage remained higher than the 
desired basic wage, this was not the case for the Chinese workers, who deemed “reasonable” 
to receive a basic wage even higher than what they actually were paid the previous month 
when doing a considerable amount of overtime. This hints at a deep dissatisfaction, a feeling 
that appears even more evident if we consider the fifth column, the desired take-home wage, 
which is the response to the question “considering your current workload, how much do you 
think would be a reasonable salary for you?” Chinese workers considered reasonable to 
receive RMB 4,374.80 (roughly $657.24) as a payment for their workload, or 34.1% more 
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than their take-home wage, while Cambodian workers desired $304.53, 25% more than what 
they were making. 
Still, all of this must be put in the context of the perceived economic needs, displayed 
in last column of the figure. As mentioned above, international advocacy groups and 
Cambodian independent unions have been campaigning since 2014 for a living wage of $177 
a month. A survey undertaken by several unions and NGOs in June 2016 found that workers 
in Phnom Penh needed around $142 a month for their food and non-food expenditures 
(Centre for Policy Studies 2016). The survey question asked concerned not only basic living 
expenses, but was formulated in broader terms: “On average, how much do you think you 
need every month to cover the basic living expenses of yourself and your immediate family 
(your partner, children, parents or other people whom you have to support)?” This reflected 
the fact that, as Arnold (2017, 26) has noted, “workers’ politics and livelihood concerns 
include and extend beyond the (peri-) urban factory floor to rural households.” Considering 
that Cambodian workers came from rather extended families – besides their parents, 84.2% of 
them had three siblings or more – and that most family members remained in the countryside, 
they felt they needed an average of $345 a month, compared to the RMB 1,958.80 ($294.28) 
of the Chinese workers. Another reason why the figure is much higher in Cambodia is that 
while 82.4% of the Chinese workers lived in a dormitory provided by the factory – which is 
evidence of the persistence of the so-called “dormitory labour regime” (see Smith and Pun 
2006) – paying only a symbolic fee for water, gas and electricity averaging only RMB 122 
($18.33) a month, Cambodian workers had to find private accommodation, paying a monthly 
average of $34.36. Chinese workers also had access to cheaper food, paying an average of 
RMB 311.57 ($46.81) for their meals, compared to the $71.66 paid by Cambodian workers. 
Finally, although this research did not touch upon this subject, many Cambodian workers and 
their families are also heavily indebted to microfinance institutions (Blau 2017). This 
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disparity in the expenses had reverberations in the amount of remittances sent home. While 
Chinese workers were able to send home RMB 1,724.90 ($259.14) a month, or 57.5% of their 
take-home wage, Cambodian workers could send only $67.55 or 22.2% of their take-home 
wage. 
The point here is not to compare living costs and wages between the two countries in 
absolute terms, but rather to assess the ratio between actual wages, desired wages, and living 
costs, taking into account the perceptions of the workers themselves. The data collected 
highlight that while Chinese workers gain wages significantly higher than what they feel they 
need, Cambodian workers earn much less than their perceived needs. Even when asked how 
much they would deem “reasonable” as a compensation for their actual workload, they 
indicated an amount lower than what they felt necessary. This a crucial point that determines 
the different patterns of labour activism in the two countries: while Chinese workers are 
unsatisfied about their salaries because they wish to earn more in order to have more money 
to save or spend, Cambodian workers feel that the very subsistence of themselves and their 
immediate family is at risk. 
 
INSTRUMENTAL VIEWS OF THE LAW 
 
Wages are the most apparent reason of discontent, but there are other, more subtle factors at 
play in determining workers’ expectations and demands. One of these factors is the saturation 
of the official rhetoric of labour rights promoted by the authorities through the labour law. 
Both China and Cambodia have adopted relatively progressive labour legislations, but the 
rationale that prompted the authorities in the two countries to pass such laws is very different.  
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In the case of Cambodia, this was largely due to the external influence of foreign 
donors that in the early 1990s supported the rebuilding of the country after more than two 
decades of war and chaos (see Hughes 2007; Ward and Mouyly 2016). Indeed, as Slocomb 
(2006, 376) has pointed out in her study of the role of ideology in the modern Cambodian 
state, “hegemony is taken for granted by the Cambodian ruling elite, who have historically 
assumed the passive acquiescence of the masses – particularly the rural masses – and relied 
upon the unifying force of Khmerness, the spiritual sense of belonging to a discrete cultural 
group, to legitimise their use of power.” In 1991, after the warring factions that were vying 
for power in the wake of the retreat of the Vietnamese occupying forces signed the Paris 
Peace Accords, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia took over the running 
of the country pending the democratic elections of 1993. At that time, foreign donor countries 
that contributed most of the government budget came to hold a disproportionate power over 
Cambodian politics, determining its course, language and values. Eager to gain international 
recognition and support, Cambodian authorities had no choice but to conform to these donor 
discourses, incorporating in their legislative activity and rhetoric key concepts as civil society, 
good governance, decentralisation, gender equality and human rights (Slocomb 2006, 391). 
This was reflected in the Constitution written after the signing of the peace accords, which 
contained commitment to the rule of law and to human rights, including specific protections 
of labour rights such as the right of citizens to choose their employment, equal pay for equal 
work, guarantee of employment for women during pregnancy, the right to maternity leave and 
the right to establish associations and to strike (Adler and Woolcock 2009). This kind of 
language – although often betrayed in practice – created spaces of opportunity for activism 
that eventually led to the emergence of a lively third sector of NGOs, trade unions, and 
community-based associations, as well as to a corresponding upsurge in political and 
industrial dissent.  
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The appearance of the Cambodian garment industry during this early period of 
economic and political consolidation brought with it a stronger discourse on labour rights. As 
Arnold and Shih (2010, 402) have pointed out, the industry went through three phases of 
development. First, from the mid to the late 1990s, Cambodia began to establish its export-
oriented garment production. Although in 1996 the authorities adopted a progressive labour 
law that reflected the values enshrined in the new Constitution, labour conditions remained 
dire. Second, from 1999 to 2004 Cambodia attempted to reinvent itself as an “ethical 
producer” under the US-Cambodia Textile and Trade Agreement (TATA), prompted by 
criticisms from international unions and anti-sweatshop movements (Polaski 2006). The 
agreement bound increasing import quotas to the US market with improvement in labour 
standards, with the International Labour Organization (ILO) in charge of monitoring progress 
through an innovative programme called Better Factories Cambodia (Kolben 2004). In this 
period, monitoring and the eagerness of the Cambodian authorities and business community 
to continue to benefit from TATA led to a degree of improvement in labour conditions in the 
garment factories, something that could be seen, for instance, in the widespread use of open-
ended contracts (Yale Law Clinic 2011). Although the relevant literature generally portrays 
the  Better Factories Cambodia programme as a success (DiCaprio 2013; Polaski 2006), 
critics have highlighted how the ILO programme, with its focus on monitoring, is the fruit of 
neo-liberal approach that favours social stability and economic development over the 
empowerment of social actors (Hughes 2007 Arnold 2017; Ward and Mouyly 2016). It was 
only in a third phase, after the end of TATA in 2004 and after the lifting of safeguard quotas 
imposed by the US government against China in 2008, that Cambodia attempted to reposition 
itself as a globally competitive textile and garment export platform, setting aside labour 
protection and focusing instead on more conventional competitive factors, such as enhancing 
productivity and lowering wages. Since then, while international legitimacy remains a key 
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concern for the Cambodian authorities, “increasingly … the imperative [has been] shifting to 
legitimation through accumulation as the state continues to depend on aid and foreign direct 
investment to secure its own investment, and to deflect attention from various rights concerns, 
including labour” (Ward and Mouyly 2016, 268-269). 
In the case of China, the decision of the CCP to promote labour rights was dictated not 
only by the necessity to appease foreign investors, who needed a stable legal environment for 
their investments, but above all by the need to boost the Party’s legitimacy on the internal 
front. According to Gallagher (2005, 101-103), there were three main reasons for the turn of 
the party-state towards the law: the need to reinforce the legitimacy of the political system, in 
crisis as much for the fallout of Cultural Revolution, as for the unintended consequences of 
the economic reforms; the necessity of having a predictable set of rules in order to open up 
the economy to international commerce; and the acknowledgement by the CCP of the 
importance of the “rule of law” (yifa zhiguo) as a tool of social control. Since its 
establishment in the early 1920s, the CCP has been presenting itself as “the vanguard of the 
Chinese working class” (gongren jieji de xianfengdui) – a title that to this day remains 
enshrined in the first article of the Party Constitution. As Chen Feng (2007, 62) has noted,  
 
under Maoist state socialism, Chinese workers acquired considerable social and 
economic entitlements, ranging from lifetime employment to substantial benefits 
including low-cost housing, health care, pensions, and education, but they did not 
enjoy real and meaningful civil and political rights. 
 
The situation began to change only at the beginning of the reform era, as the Chinese 
authorities began to encourage private entrepreneurship and allowed foreign investors to set 
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up shop in newly-established Special Economic Zones (SEZ). The foundations of the Chinese 
labour legislation were laid out in the early 1980s with the adoption of legal norms applicable 
exclusively in the SEZ (Sit 1985). The following decade saw the proliferation of labour 
regulations valid only for certain areas, sectors, or types of ownership, and in the early 1990s, 
the regulatory apparatus had become so chaotic that continuous uncertainties and 
contradictions risked becoming an obstacle for investments (Cooney, Biddulph, and Zhu 
2013, 44-46). Concurrently, growing worker discontent expressed through a wave of 
industrial conflicts alerted the Chinese authorities to the need to find new means to boost their 
legitimacy among the workers (Sheehan 1998).  
It was then that the CCP decided to accelerate the pace of the legislative process that 
eventually led to the adoption of a unified labour law, in agenda since the early 1980s but 
perpetually deferred pending a reform of the state industry (Josephs 1995; Yue 2011; Cooney, 
Biddulph, and Zhu 2013, 50-52). In July 1994, after a series of consultations between the 
Ministry of Labour, the official union and the academic community, they passed the first 
Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China (Yue 2011). In its final formulation, the text of 
the Law remained very vague, leaving a free hand for the party-state to intervene in industrial 
relations (Harper Ho 2009, 37). Besides maintaining several grey areas – in particular for 
what concerned atypical forms of labour – the new legislation also included many exceptions 
aimed at not scaring investors away (Cooney, Biddulph, and Zhu 2013; Xu 2008-2009). Even 
more important, the Labour Law introduced a strong imbalance between the protection of 
individual rights, described in very detailed terms, and collective rights, which the party-state 
considered politically threatening and therefore chose to water down or ignore altogether 
(Chen 2007, 60). Although in the 2000s the Chinese authorities further codified labour 
legislation with the adoption of a series of fundamental laws – some of which had attracted 
strong opposition by both domestic and foreign business groups due to their perceived 
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partisanship towards the interests of labour (Gallagher and Dong 2011) – this imbalance 
between individual and collect rights was never redressed. 
In sum, while in Cambodia, the official discourse of labour rights is mainly targeted at 
foreign donors, the Chinese authorities have promoted labour rights in order to boost internal 
legitimacy and maintain social stability. In particular, the Chinese authorities have realised 
that the law can be a powerful instrument to circumscribe the demands of the workers within 
politically acceptable discursive boundaries – for instance, allowing individual economic 
demands and discouraging collective political ones – thus preventing labour discontent from 
escalating into a political challenge (Chan and Siu 2011; Cheng 2017; Hui 2016a; 2016b). In 
this respect, Chinese labour law can be considered as an hegemonic discourse (Blecher 2002), 
or, in Hui’s words, as an “ endeavour of the ruling class to constitute workers’ worldviews 
and values in such ways that the latter may criticize, but not challenge fundamentally, the 
legitimacy of the capitalist economy and the party-state, and that they may resist, but not take 
rebellious actions to transform the socio-political and economic systems” (Hui 2017, 81). 
In practice, do these different instrumental views of labour rights have an impact on 
how garment workers perceive their entitlements in China and Cambodia? The survey results 
reported here suggest that this is the case in at least three respects. First, while legal awareness 
is generally low in both countries, with most Cambodian workers requiring long explanations 
about the meaning of “labour law,” Chinese workers displayed a selective knowledge of 
labour rights that is very much in line with the official discourse in its focus on individual 
rights, especially those related to workers’ direct economic interests. For instance, more than 
81% of the Chinese workers were able to reply correctly to a series of questions on how to 
calculate the overtime payment on ordinary days, weekends and public holidays, while less 
than 10% of the Cambodian workers were able to reply to the same question regarding 
overtime payment on ordinary days, a figure that shot up to around 65% for overtime on 
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Sundays and public holidays. The opposite was true for those norms that do not impact 
economic interests, for instance those on the legal limits to the amount of overtime, which, if 
enforced, would significantly reduce the income of the workers. Only 1.2% of the Chinese 
workers knew that their overtime should not have exceeded 36 hours a month, compared to 
90.7% of the Cambodian workers who knew that their overtime should not have exceeded 
two hours a day.  
Second, there are marked differences between the workers in the two samples in the 
level of confidence in the law, with the Chinese workers much more ready to have faith – 
until proved otherwise – in the power of the legal system to protect them, a finding in line 
with the Gallagher and Wang (2013, 204) observation that in China “legal experience leads to 
higher levels of disillusionment and more negative perceptions of the legal system’s 
effectiveness and fairness… non-users tend to have vague but benevolent notions of the legal 
system and its effectiveness.” When asked whether they believed that the national labour law 
was able to protect the rights of the workers, 85.9% of the Chinese workers responded 
affirmatively, compared to 57.7% of the Cambodian workers. This trust in the law in the 
Chinese case clearly does not come from direct experience, as only 0.4% of the Chinese 
sample – one person – had attempted to solve a problem through the legal system and only 
14% knew somebody who had, while in Cambodia the respective percentages were 15.5% 
and 52.2%. Nor does this faith automatically translate into willingness to demand redress for 
rights violations through the legal system, often perceived in both countries as a time-
consuming, expensive, and complicated option. In particular, as we will see, in China it 
remains easier for the workers to “vote with their feet” than to undertake a long and possibly 
costly legal fight, especially in light of the availability of jobs due to the labour shortages in 
coastal areas. 
Finally, there are significant discrepancies in the perception of the state’s role in the 
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event of a labour dispute. The Chinese legislation provides a process for the resolution of 
labour disputes articulated in four stages: (i) mediation, which is supposed to be voluntary, 
but in many cases becomes mandatory, as the authorities attempt to reduce the burden on 
arbitration committees and courts; (ii) arbitration by arbitral committees set up by local labour 
departments, which are bound to give an award in no more than 60 days, with the arbitral 
award considered binding in disputes on matters related to the payment of wages, the 
reimbursement of medical expenses for labour-related injuries, and compensations of an 
amount lower than 12 months of minimum wage; (iii) and two levels of judgement in court 
(Harper Ho 2009). In Cambodia, instead, labour disputes are supposed to be resolved through 
workplace-level negotiations, conciliation by the Labour Inspectorate of the Ministry of 
Labour and Vocational Training, the courts, or by arbitration by the Arbitration Council a 
national tripartite body (Ponak and Taras 2016). Conciliation is voluntary in individual cases, 
but mandatory in collective disputes. If conciliation fails, either party can bring the case to 
court, but in the event of a collective dispute first they are obliged to go through arbitration, 
which should take no more than 15 days of referral. In such a context, my survey shows that 
Chinese workers are more prone to seek help from bureaucratic actors close to the party-state 
instead of resorting to independent or semi-independent actors, such as labour NGOs, law 
firms and media, a finding that resonates with Landry’s conclusion that Chinese citizens are 
more trusting of those institutions that are closely associated with the state than with non-
bureaucratic actors (Landry 2009).  
When asked what they would have done in the event of a problem with their 
managers, only 21.6% of the Chinese workers said that they would have been willing to stand 
up to “protect their rights,” 6.8% stated that they would have “endured it,” and 71.6% 
declared that they would have simply “changed to a better job” – a situation that can be 
explained in relation to the relative easiness with which workers can switch to a different job 
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in the current market circumstances. In Cambodia, where workers face a fundamental 
challenge to their survival and cannot afford to lose a job for long periods of time, it was 
exactly the opposite: 74.9% of the workers were willing to stand up for their rights, compared 
to 13.7% who would have endured it and 11.3% who would have walked away. More 
importantly, those who replied that they were willing to fight for their rights were asked who 
they would have sought help from at first. In China, 74% of the respondents declared that 
they would seek help from labour departments, the lowest echelon of the labour bureaucracy, 
plus an additional 7.4% who expressed their preference for the local office for letters and 
visit, an extra-judicial state body in charge of receiving petitions from citizens. In other 
words, most Chinese workers would have sought the help of the party-state in solving a 
dispute, a further display of trust towards officialdom. In Cambodia, on the contrary, as much 
as 88.5% of the respondents declared that they would seek help from a trade union, that, is, a 
body outside the state (although many Cambodian unions remain little more than “yellow” 
unions). 
The fact that the Chinese workers sampled maintained a highly individualistic view of 
labour rights, believed in the power of the law promulgated by the authorities to protect them, 
and were ready to seek help from the party-state when in need supports the claim that the 
Chinese labour law functions as a “hegemonic discourse” that shores up labour activism. Of 
course, as noted above, most of those workers did not have any experience with the law. If 
they had, they probably would have found out about the many limitations of the legal system 
and the inability or unwillingness of the party-state to provide help, which, in turn, would 
have made them disenchanted and possibly more prone to engage in activism. Indeed, as 
Gallagher has noted, Chinese workers who had experienced the complicated end result of a 
labour dispute developed an attitude of “informed disenchantment,” which contains “elements 
of raised legal consciousness in terms of knowledge about the law and feelings of greater 
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efficiency and understanding of legal strategy with a concomitant sense of disappointment 
and frustration about inequities and dysfunctional aspects of China’s developing legal system” 
(Gallagher 2006, 281-282). Yet, not that many workers in China ever find themselves in a 
situation in which they have to put their faith to test, which means that the official discourse 
holds up among large swathes of the workforce. In Cambodia, on the contrary, there is no 
faith in the thaumaturgical power of the state, and workers are more prone to take matters in 
their own hands. That Cambodian garment workers refer to the unions as their favourite 
choice when seeking redress in the event of a labour dispute also highlights a fundamental 
difference in the perception of labour rights among Cambodian and Chinese workforce: while 
Chinese worker are largely unaware of collective rights, which are ignored or watered down 
in the existing legislation and official discourse, in particular on matters related to trade 
unions and freedom of association, as will be detailed in the next section, their Cambodian 
counterparts are highly cognisant of what a union is and how it is supposed to work.  
 
UNION PLURALISM AND PERCEPTION OF STRIKES 
 
To this day, the ACFTU maintains a monopoly of labour representation in China. The 
ACFTU is a mass organisation of Leninist imprint that is supposed to function as a 
“transmission belt” between the CCP and the workers, as well as a dispenser of social welfare 
and assistance. Counting almost 300 million members, the ACFTU considers any attempt at 
labour organising outside its hierarchy as a fundamental threat to its legitimacy and it goes to 
considerable lengths to crush labour NGOs and other forms of spontaneous worker solidarity 
(Bloomberg, November 11, 2016).4  
In Cambodia the situation is different. During the Vietnamese occupation, the 
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authorities set up a system of union-like “syndicates” embedded in government ministries or 
agencies in provinces and districts (Nuon and Serrano 2010, 20). Since the mid-1990s, with 
the growth of the garment industry and especially after the enforcement of TATA, union 
federations started to appear. Some were politically aligned with the ruling party and pushed 
the view that unions could assist workers in achieving their rights without resorting to strikes, 
but using negotiations and patronage instead; others sided with the opposition and adopted a 
more militant approach in which labour struggles were linked to broader political goals; and 
others again considered themselves “independent,” flaunting strong links to international 
NGOs and civil society  (Nuon and Serrano 2010, 25-27). The existence of a political 
opposition to the regime led by Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) – embodied in 
the 1990s by the Sam Rainsy Party (previously known as Khmer Nation Party) – played a 
particularly important role in fostering trade unionism in Cambodia (Norén-Nilsson 2016, 
141). While paying lip service to civil society and labour rights to appease foreign donors, the 
Cambodian authorities were wary of the political threat posed by those non-aligned unions 
and, in order to weaken them, encouraged the establishment of union federations in line with 
their interest and priorities. Concomitantly, they also resorted to more extreme measures, 
condoning – if not encouraging – violence when it helped to keep the most outspoken unions 
in check. In January 2004, Chea Vichea, president of the main opposition-aligned union 
federation, the Free Trade Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia was gunned down 
in broad daylight in the centre of Phnom Penh, in a political killing that sent shock waves 
throughout the nascent Cambodian labour movement. Another unionist from the same 
federation was killed later the same year and yet another in 2007 (Nuon and Serrano 2010, 
26-27).  
While shocking, these deaths did not stop independent and oppositional unionism, 
which could count on the steadfast support first of the Sam Rainsy Party and then, from 2012, 
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of the newly-formed Cambodian National Rescue Party, which in recent years – before being 
disbanded in November 2017 – has consistently been campaigning for higher minimum 
wages, framing this as a right (Norén-Nilsson 2016, 185). Based on data provided by the 
Cambodian Labour Confederation (April 2, 2015), in 2014, there were 13 union 
confederations (only four of which appeared to be active), 79 federations and 2,981 plant 
unions. The unionisation rate in the garment sector is particularly high, with about 60% of 
Cambodian garment workers holding union membership. Still, as Arnold and Shih (2010, 
416) have pointed out, such a high rate does not mean that Cambodian unions are necessarily 
strong, as such fragmentation leaves “many unions weak, under-funded, competing with one 
another, and subject to corruption and political interference by the CPP.” Arnold (2017, 28) 
has also questioned “the potential for hierarchically organized, workplace-oriented unions, 
typically male-led in a feminized sector, to represent adequately the complex multiplicity of 
class subjects, experiences and desires,” a situation that in recent years has often led workers 
bypassing the unions and mobilising spontaneously to put forward their demands. The future 
of the Cambodian independent unions is further threatened by the ruling party’s increasingly 
authoritarian rule, in particular by the passage in April 2016 of a very controversial Trade 
Union Law that established a series of strict requirement for the process of union formation, 
imposed burdensome reporting obligations and severely limits the right to strike (Palatino 
2016). 
This article highlights a significant difference in how garment workers in China and 
Cambodia relate to the unions. Although all Chinese factories in the survey had a branch of 
the ACFTU on their premises, the workers were largely unaware of this. Not only did 70.3% 
of the Chinese workers not know whether there was a union in their factory – 56% had no 
clue even whether they were union members – but also, when asked if they knew what a trade 
union was, 50% of them stated that it was “not clear,” to them, with an additional 28% saying 
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that they had never heard the word “trade union” (gonghui) before. None of the workers who 
declared that their factory had a union had ever taken part in a union election, nor believed the 
factory union could represent the interests of the workers. This lack of knowledge among 
workers with a relatively long employment history may appear surprising if we consider that 
the term “trade union” is current in the Chinese public debate, but it can be explained in light 
of three factors. First, Chinese garment workers are mostly low-skilled migrants who have 
spent their working life in private manufacturing companies, a context in which unions play 
almost no role, compared, for instance, to state-owned companies or other government-run 
institutions, where unions at least provide some welfare and organise some recreational 
activities. Second, grassroots unions in private companies are for the most part set up by the 
employers to comply with top-down demands and feature managers in top positions, with the 
result that they are completely detached from the actual workforce. Finally, as we have seen, 
the trade union that features in the official propaganda of the party-state is little more than a 
top-down dispenser of social welfare. This detachment emerged clearly from the interviews. 
When Chinese garment workers were asked their opinion about what the proper function of a 
union should be, the most common answer – after “I don’t know” – was that unions should 
“organise recreational activities,” such as basketball games, birthday parties and outings, or 
distribute small gifts to the workers, a response that mirrored the official discourse of the 
Chinese authorities on the role of the trade unions. Only one worker mentioned that the union 
should take care of the wages of the workers (Interview, Dongguan, September 11, 2016).  
In Cambodia, on the contrary, despite all the constraints that mar the activities of trade 
unions, garment workers had a much clearer picture of the associational life in their factories, 
where multiple unions were competing for membership. Fully 96.9% knew for certain that 
there were unions in the factory, 78.7% declared that they were union members, and 63.6% 
claimed to know what a trade union is (with a further 6.9% claiming to “know a little”). Even 
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if only 22.3% of the Cambodian workers had taken part in the election of union 
representatives – which hints at a lack of union democracy – 84.4% believed that the factory 
unions were able to represent the interests of the workers. Moreover, unlike their Chinese 
counterparts, the Cambodian workers who were interviewed had a very clear idea of how a 
union should work. While some of them complained about the corruption of union officials 
and expressed discontent about the continuous infighting among unions, the refrain in 
conversations was that the union should “look after the workers, understanding their problems 
and their needs” (Interview, Phnom Penh, September 15, 2016), that unions “help to solve 
problems for the workers, for instance by negotiating on their behalf in the event of a dispute 
with the factory” and they will “not allow the employers to get their way with the workers” 
(Interviews, Phnom Penh, September 13, 2016).  
What about the workers’ perception of fundamental collective rights, such as the right 
to bargain collectively and the right to strike? In both countries, knowledge of collective 
bargaining was low: as many as 87.6% of the Cambodian workers did not know what 
collective bargaining is, compared to 98.8% of the Chinese workers. This can be explained 
considering that this issue remains quite marginal in the Cambodian political debate, while 
the Chinese official discourse defines collective bargaining (jiti tanpan) as “collective 
negotiation” (jiti xieshang), a largely formalistic and non-confrontational process led by the 
official union and of scarce consequence for the workers (Chan and Hui 2014, 225). For what 
concerns the right to strike, my findings are more ambiguous. Although China has ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which at article 8.1(d) 
binds the government to ensure “the right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity 
with the laws of the particular country,” the legislation does not mention the right to strike, 
consigning it to a grey area (Chang and Cooke 2015, 441). In Cambodia, instead, the Labour 
Law allows workers to strike, but only after all other methods of dispute resolution – 
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negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration – have failed and after the union members have 
approved the strike by secret ballot and given a seven working days’ notice to both employer 
and Ministry of Labour. Given these onerous restrictions, even in Cambodia labour stoppages 
have always been – and will likely continue to be – mostly spontaneous and formally illegal. 
Considering these different legal contexts, how do Chinese and Cambodian workers perceive 
strikes as strategy to protect their rights? According to survey responses, Cambodian garment 
workers are much more prone to see strikes in a positive light. While only 3.2% of the 
Chinese workers in the sample admitted that they had joined a strike before, 55.5% of their 
Cambodian counterparts did. More important, when asked whether they agreed with people or 
organisations resorting to strikes to protect their rights and interests, only 38.4% of the 
Chinese workers said that they “totally agreed” (3.6%) or “quite agreed” (34.8%), compared 
to 66.5% of the Cambodian workers (23.2% of whom “totally agreed”). 
These data highlight a substantial difference in the way Chinese and Cambodian 
garment workers relate to trade unions. Chinese workers are largely unaware of the existence 
of unions in their workplace and generally believe that such organisation should do little more 
than organise recreational activities. This attitude has clearly been fostered by the Chinese 
party-state – as well as by the ACFTU – not only through laws and regulations that reinforce 
the monopoly of the official union and restrict its role to welfare provision, but also through 
sheer repression of autonomous labour organising in any form (Franceschini and Nesossi 
2018). In this context, Chinese workers are reduced to individuals and their collective power 
is shattered, unless some traumatic event such as the closure of the factory, the discovery that 
social security contributions have not been paid, or mass lay-offs – brings them together in a 
common struggle. Even in that case, though, adopting extreme measures such as going on 
strike remains a last resort for them, a desperate measure to deal with a hopeless situation. In 
Cambodia, the situation is very different. Although the existing legislation seriously hinders 
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the ability of trade unions in Cambodia to launch strikes and most labour mobilisations in the 
country thus remain formally illegal, unions play a fundamental role in fostering worker 
solidarity. At the national level, they do so by constantly campaigning for better labour 
conditions and higher minimum wages, by carrying out surveys and investigations and by 
assisting workers in their individual and collective struggles. At the grassroots level, the need 
to compete in order to boost their membership push Cambodian grassroots unionists to follow 
up on workers’ problems, taking leadership roles in the event of a dispute and even 
encouraging workers to go on strike. Most important, the very existence of independent 
unions in the country reminds the workers even in those factories that are not unionised that 
collective struggle – although not devoid of risks – is always a possibility. This fundamental 
difference has momentous consequence for the patterns of activism of Chinese and 
Cambodian workers in the garment sector and beyond. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Cambodian and Chinese garment industries are both characterised by considerable 
precariousness and exploitation and in both countries workers who engage in workplace 
activism face dire consequences. Why then are Cambodian garment workers more prone to 
undertake large-scale co-ordinated industrial actions to demand higher wages than their 
Chinese counterparts? To respond to this question, this article has compared Cambodian and 
Chinese garment workers in three main respects: their expectations towards wages; their 
awareness and perception of the labour law; and their relationship with the unions.  
Concerning wages, workers in the two countries are substantially unsatisfied with the 
level of their remuneration and believe that they should earn more in light of their workload. 
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Still, while Chinese workers live in dormitories provided by the factory and generally come 
from relatively small families with more than one breadwinner – a result of the one-child 
policy and of four decades of economic reforms – Cambodian workers usually have to rent 
their own accommodation outside the factory and need to support large families who stay 
behind in the rural areas. This determines a significant gap in the living expenses, remittances, 
and perceived needs of the two workforces, with Chinese workers gaining wages significantly 
higher than what they feel they need and their Cambodian counterparts earning much less 
than their perceived needs. In other words, while Chinese garment workers are unsatisfied 
because of what they think is an “unreasonable” remuneration for their labour, Cambodian 
garment workers feel that the very survival of their family is at risk.  
Regarding workers’ awareness and perception of the labour law, it is apparent that the 
Chinese and Cambodian authorities have adopted progressive labour legislations for very 
different reasons. While the Cambodian government sought to use the language of labour 
rights in order to boost its standing among foreign donors, the rhetoric of the Chinese party-
state represents an effort to boost its internal legitimacy, as well as an attempt to circumscribe 
the demands of the workers within politically acceptable discursive boundaries. This effort to 
promote the labour law as a “hegemonic discourse” in China seems to have borne its fruits, as 
Chinese garment workers, compared to their Cambodian counterparts, display a higher 
awareness – although still low in general terms – of those individual rights that have a direct 
impact on their income, and an almost non-existent awareness of collective rights. Moreover, 
Chinese garment workers display considerable trust in the ability of the party-state and its 
bureaucracy to protect their rights and interests, although in most cases this faith is based on a 
lack of experience, as very few ever have a chance test the official channels to solve a labour 
dispute, as quitting and finding a new job remains far easier. While this penetration of the 
official discourse of labour rights can be seen as constituting a brake on the activism of 
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Chinese garment workers, this is not the case in Cambodia, where workers are largely 
unaware even of the existence of the labour legislation and are not constrained by a belief in 
the power and willingness of the authorities to help them. 
On the matter of the trade unions, contrary to what happens in China, where union 
monopoly belongs to a single official organisation, in Cambodian garment factories there is a 
plurality of unions vying for the support of workers. Although Cambodian unions work in a 
highly repressive environment and face significant legal limitations that curb their 
effectiveness in protecting members’ rights and interests, this disparity has practical 
implications for labour activism. Chinese garment workers generally do not know whether 
there is a union in their factory, nor do they have any clear idea about what a union is and 
how it is supposed to work. On the contrary, most Cambodian garment workers are union 
members and – although few have ever taken part in a union election – they believe that 
factory unions can stand up for their rights. Unsurprisingly, in the event of a labour dispute, 
most Cambodian workers would seek help from the unions; this would be almost unthinkable 
for their Chinese counterparts. All of this confirms that Chinese garment workers have a low 
awareness of collective rights, a finding that can be seen also in the data that show that 
Cambodian workers are much more approving of strikes as a way to protect their rights than 
their Chinese counterparts. In other words, union pluralism, albeit flawed, plays a 
fundamental role in boosting workers’ solidarity and collective struggles. 
The elements analysed in this article obviously do not exhaust all the possible factors 
that foster and shape labour activism in contexts as complex and diverse as contemporary 
China and Cambodia. Still, by comparing the two contexts and peering into the subjectivity of 
workers in different countries – their expectations, legal knowledge and even feelings – it is 
possible to gain some new insights not only on how states attempt to control and channel 
labour activism, but also on why workers react in different ways to the common challenges 
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they face. Only by this act of intellectual voyeurism will we be able to understand – and 
possibly overcome – the limitations of much labour activism today. 
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1 The exchange rate was set at around 4,000 riel per dollar. In this article, all costs in 
Cambodia are in US$, which is the currency to which workers and people generally referred 
to in their daily life and in interviews and discussions. 
 
2 There have been some notable exceptions. See Chan (2010), Chan and Hui (2012), Chan 
and Pun (2009), Friedman (2014) and Yang (2015). 
 
3 Only in June 2018, the Cambodian authorities passed a Minimum Wage Law to lay the 
foundations for an “universal minimum wage” to be determined every year through “tripartite 
consultation” (Khmer Time, June 8, 2018). 
 
4 Although some scholars have pointed out that the official union is far from a uniform entity 
(Liu, Li, and Kim 2011) and there is a growing body of literature that studies Chinese 
experiments with union democracy at the company level (Chan 2015), the ACFTU is 
generally looked upon as an inefficient body, especially when it comes to representing the 
rights and interests of its supposed constituency. In light of this, some scholars have even 
raised doubts about whether the ACFTU should be considered a union at all (Taylor and Li 
2007).  
 
